Call for expulsion of mullahs’ Intelligence and Qods agents from Europe and U.S. and disclosure of their actions

Disclosure of espionage activity of an element of the terrorist Qods Force called Ali Mansouri and his arrest in Tel Aviv airport once again revealed part of mullahs’ regime actions under various cover outside Iran. On September 30, the French news agency (AFP) reported on the arrest of an Iranian on September 11, suspect of espionage activity in Tel Aviv who had in possession pictures from the U.S. Embassy.
According to the Belgian Le Soir, this man “had identified himself as a PMOI supporter… he was an agent dispatched to Belgium to infiltrate PMOI” (October 1, 2013). The media in Israel reported his arrest in his third trip to that country for spying and carrying out mission for the Qods Force. He used a Belgian passport under the name of Alex Mans and planned to pave the way for future trips by registering a company in Israel. After each trip to Israel, Mansouri went to Tehran to offer his report. His liaisons with the terrorist Qods Force were Hamed Abdollahi and Majid Alawi. Additionally, Haj Mostafa, Haj Hamid Nemati, and Mehdi Khanbabaei from Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) have met with him in Iran.
Hamed Abdollahi, together with Abdolreza Shahlaei, and Ali Gholam Shakouri are Brigadier Generals of the terrorist Qods Force involved in the plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to Washington on October 2011.
Majid Alawi is a senior official of the Ministry of Intelligence who went to Thailand on 19 January 2012 using the pseudonym of Hossein Tehrani and then, following several explosions on February 14 in Bangkok, seven people were arrested, four being Iranian agents of mullahs’ Qods Force and Intelligence. For eight years, Majid Alawi was covert MOIS agent in Sudan and Saudi Arabia and once his identity was exposed in Sudan, he returned to Tehran and became Director General of Arab States in MOIS. He has connections with Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestine’s Islamic Jihad. After putting aside the Minister of Intelligence Mohsen Ejehi, regime’s former president Ahmadinejad introduced Majid Alawi as alter ego to Minister of Intelligence.
Since 1980, Ali Mansouri was a merchant in Turkey and expressed sympathy to PMOI. He was present in Istanbul at the time of four terrorist operations by the regime against PMOI: The abduction of Abolhassan Mojtahedzadeh (December 1988); assassination attempt on PMOI member Hossein Abedini (March 1990); abduction, torture and killing PMOI member Akbar Ghorbani (June 1992); and assassination of PMOI members Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi (March 1996).
In July 2005, without prior invitation, he participated in the celebration for anniversary of Mrs. Rajavi’s freedom and under pretext of handing a letter to Mrs. Rajavi attempted to get close to her but failed as he was stopped by her security.
This agent used the tactic and claim of offering contributions to infiltrate the network of supporters of the resistance. Once he learned that this tactic is ineffective, he asked to have his contributions returned to him, including a claim that he had given loans to PMOI after the assassination attempt on Mr. Abedini. However, there were no such loans; just that he had incurred some expenses for Mr. Abedini’s medical treatment after the assassination attempt and there were no vouchers. Nonetheless, PMOI returned the whole amount claimed by him (the receipts are available).
NCRI Security and Anti-terrorism Commission learned in 2007 that although this individual has Belgian nationality, he covertly travels to Iran under the pretext of visiting his brother. Hence, it advised PMOI supporters to disassociate with him.
Qods Force and MOIS register phony trade companies and through these companies transfer exorbitant amounts of money to pay expenses of espionage, agents and ghastly terrorist plots. These companies are usually registered by Iranians who have lived abroad for a long time, seem opposed to the regime, have a history of supporting PMOI, and have been involved in trade business. One of the main agents of the Qods Force in the assassination plot of the Saudi Ambassador in Washington was such an Iranian with U.S. nationality who was supposedly in the business of selling cars.
In the report of a joint probe by Pentagon and the U.S. Congress into MOIS published in December 2012 it is noted: “The Iranian government considers Mojahedin-e-Khalq to be the organization that most threatens the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the main responsibilities of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security is to conduct covert operations against Mojahedin-e-Khalq and to identify and eliminate its members.” The report elaborates on one example and writes: “In 1996 Masoud Khodabandeh decided to leave the organization. Later, he married Anne Singleton. Soon after their marriage, MOIS forced them to cooperate by threatening to confiscate Khodabandeh’s mother’s extensive property in Tehran. Singleton and Khodabandeh then agreed to work for MOIS and spy on MEK. In 2002 Singleton met in Tehran with MOIS agents who were interested in her background… In 2004 Singleton finally met her brother-in-law, Ibrahim, who was sent from Syria to Iran after the Syrians arrested him. Eventually, MOIS forced him to cooperate as well.”
Anti-espionage institutions in many European countries such as Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, etc., in their annual reports stipulate that the most important task of MOIS abroad are activities against PMOI and NCRI, including to demonize them and to collect information on them. These reports underscore that MOIS conducts these missions through employing former members of these groups. Netherlands’ intelligence service, in its last annual report of 2012, says: “the Iranian government is still fully active in its fight against the opposition movement Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO). It has emerged that the Iranian intelligence service is directing a European network that is also active in the Netherlands. This network consists of former MKO members who have been recruited by the Iranian intelligence service. They have been tasked with negatively influencing the public opinion regarding the MKO by means of lobbying, publications and anti-MKO meetings. They also gather information on the MKO and its members or suspected members for the Iranian intelligence service.”
Berlin’s federal court, in a decree in May 1997 regarding the assassination of leaders of Iran’s Kurdish Democratic Party in September 1992 in Mykonos restaurant underlined that the decision for the assassination was taken by a committee composed of the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Intelligence. Subsequently, in its 29 April 1997 meeting, EU Council decided to concentrate on expulsion of Iranian regime’s intelligence agents from EU member states. Nevertheless, European countries decided to violate this decision and to continue their conciliatory relations with the regime.
NCRI Security and Anti-terrorism Commission considers the following steps as imperative to prevent mullahs’ Gestapo and regime’s terrorist foreign force from continuing and expanding their espionage and terrorist plots:
a) Arrest, trial, punishment and expulsion of spies and agents of MOIS and Qods Force
b) Disclose and publish activities of agents of MOIS and the terrorist Qods Force in Western countries, especially their activities against PMOI and NCRI, by pertinent organs and institutions in these countries
c) Obstruct misuse by agents of the religious fascism ruling Iran of the refugee status and receiving nationality through UNHCR and refugee institutions in various countries.

The Security and Anti-terrorism Commission
of The National Council of Resistance of Iran
October 13, 2013