The Hill – May 21, 2015 – Since its early days, the mullahs’ regime in Iran has been involved in proxy wars in the Middle East. A number of the regime’s high-ranking officials have said that the rationale behind its meddling in other countries’ affairs is to avoid being toppled within Iran. The sheer amount of money spent and the resources deployed by the regime for proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq is extraordinary.
The mullahs’ regional aspirations go back to the early 1980s and the start of the eight-year war with Iraq, forming proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine. In recent years and in the absence of material involvement of the United States in the region, Iran has grabbed the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. The result was an aggrandized picture of Iran’s regional power.
At the domestic level, and faced with the rising popular opposition to the dictatorship, the mullahs need a show of extra-territorial power which could easily be materialized through funding and support of terrorist groups. The ultimate goal at the domestic level is a social psychology measure to dishearten a dissident majority.
Through its regional machinations, the regime also seeks to gain leverage internationally. The mullahs have always used proxies as bargaining chips in their negotiations with western powers. Receiving rewards for using their “influence” in freeing European hostages taken by Lebanese or Palestinian groups is just one example of the benefits the mullahs accrue. Iran’s proxies also have the capacity and history of endangering American and European interests.
The most important reason for the mullahs’ destructive regional policies is that they suffer from serious internal instability. These proxies help the mullahs to conceal their internal instability and regional isolation. In spite of the unimaginable levels of suppressive measures, the Iranian people have shown their dissent whenever they have had a chance to do so. For example, many public gatherings- such as celebrations for a sports victory, religious gatherings, or disputes over the result of an election – quickly turn into protests against the mullahs’ regime. That is why the mullahs are terrified of crowds gathering for any reason on the streets, especially in big cities.
It is in the context of the high level of internal opposition to the regime that the mullahs’ fear of a war within the boundaries of Iran-whether a conflict on the streets of Tehran against the Iranian people or airstrikes against their nuclear sites-is understandable. Its aggressive regional policy, therefore, is a sign of weakness and instability, which is why a firm policy towards its aggression prompts the regime to back down.
In Yemen, for example, Houthis have been one of the proxies funded and continuously supported by the mullahs. Since the start of the attacks by the regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, Iran has avoided any material confrontation with the coalition.
The regime has been able to cause trouble and spread its terrorism primarily because of the weak response of other players, especially western governments.
In neighboring Iraq, Iran’s proxies among the Shiite militias, as well as its allies in the Iraqi Government, have allowed it to achieve what it failed to do during the eight years of Iran-Iraq war. It has also allowed it to use its proxies, official or otherwise, to attack its most formidable opposition movement, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) in their camps in Ashraf and Liberty in Iraq, to drain their resources and ability to affect change in Iran. At the height of the 2009 uprisings in Iran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asked the previous pro-Iran Iraqi Prime Minister to attack Camp Ashraf killing and injuring these dissidents, before the regime moved to crush the movement inside Iran.
Iran’s vested interest in proxy wars is not a sign of its strength. To the contrary, the regime is extremely vulnerable to any military involvement because the mullahs stand on shaky domestic grounds. The United States needs to consider the mullahs’ internal instability in developing its Iran policy, especially on the nuclear issue. It should stand with the Iranian people in their struggle to topple the current dictatorship and replace it with a democratic, non-nuclear and secular republic.

Bruce McColm is president of the Institute for Democratic Strategies and former executive director of Freedom House.