The Iranian nuclear deal looks increasingly problematic for the United States, even perilous. Yet our negotiators appear to be doing everything possible to accommodate an erratic and secretive Iranian ‎regime in their quest for an agreement that could well facilitate Iran developing a bomb, as well as encouraging additional terrorism around the world.
There are a few simple facts that it seems our negotiating team has forgotten as we move towards the deadline.
First and foremost, the Iranians need this deal much more than we do. So much more, in fact, that their economy won’t survive if we don’t lift the sanctions.
Second, we have allies in the region that may not survive if we don’t push Iran to meet terms that will genuinely halt their program.
Third, Iran is the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. President Obama admitted this himself just a few months ago, which makes it all the more disheartening that we are negotiating with them as if we’re the ones who need this deal, at any cost.
While Secretary of State John Kerry says that “We’re just working an it’s too early to make any judgments,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei appears on state television calling our terms “excessive coercion” and making it clear that “[Iran doesn’t] accept a 10-year restriction.” He continued, “We have told the negotiating team how many specific years of restrictions are acceptable. Research and development must continue during the years of restrictions.”
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has been in Vienna hoping to wrap up talks on Iran’s nuclear program and declare success. He needs to be clear that the deal must limit Iran’s ability to build a nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future. Not reaching a deal is better than reaching one which fails to do that.
Moreover, in a televised speech last week, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appeared to rule out inspections of military sites. Iran has blocked access to facilities before, but any agreement that bars inspectors from military sites they suspect of being nuclear facilities would be unacceptable. Khamenei also demanded that the economic sanctions which forced Iran to resume negotiations two years ago should be lifted as soon as the deal is signed, rather than in stages to assure compliance. And he said that any restrictions placed on Iran should last for less than the 10 to 12 years that has been proposed.
Each of those is a potential deal-breaker. To see why, it helps to recall some history. The negotiations began 12 years ago, after Iran’s covert nuclear fuel program was exposed. They continued for a decade on the basis that Iran should abandon the program entirely. That effort failed. Iran went from having a few primitive centrifuges and no stocks of enriched fuel to an extensive program with enough fuel on hand to build multiple weapons.
President Barack Obama used tougher sanctions to bring Iran back to the negotiating table to discuss an arrangement under which Iran would keep a small, closely monitored fuel program. An interim deal struck in November 2013 halted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and eliminated the most dangerous fuel stocks in exchange for limited sanctions relief. That deal remains in effect and is far more beneficial to the U.S. and its negotiating partners than it is to Iran.
Little is lost, therefore, if there’s no new agreement, the talks continue, and the status quo persists. The question is what happens if the process collapses altogether. Kerry needs to prepare for this eventuality.
Plan B should focus on ensuring there is support to escalate sanctions when the time comes. The most punishing of these have been imposed by Europe, so keeping the Europeans on board is essential. Equally, Russia, India and others must be persuaded not to actively undermine the sanctions regime. That, in turn, would require the U.S. Congress to be patient.
Kerry shouldn’t sign a bad deal. But for the sake of an effective Plan B, he also needs to ensure that if the process collapses altogether, the blame lies not with the U.S. but with Iran.

 
Doug Schoen

Excerpts from a Forbes article, 29 June 2015