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Editorial: Iran nuke deal nonstarter without site verifications

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Editorial: Iran nuke deal nonstarter without site verifications

Verification that Iran isn’t working on a nuclear bomb would appear to be an imaginary goal if United Nations nuclear inspectors can’t see what Iran may be doing in secret at military bases and other sites.
Tentative agreements have been worked out for international oversight of Iran’s enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow and at a heavy-water reactor at Arak. But, according to Gary Samore, former nonproliferation adviser to President Obama, if Iran was going to pursue a nuclear weapon, it’s not likely it would do so in those known locations. Especially not under the noses of U.N. inspectors.
The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council – the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China – along with Germany are negotiating a deal to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon in exchange for easing international sanctions that have severely hurt Iran’s economy. Restrictions on Iran would including strict monitoring and inspections.
As part of the agreement, the six nations want U.N. inspectors to be able to do “challenge inspections” of undeclared facilities if they suspect nuclear work is being done there. U.S. officials want unfettered access to the sites when suspicions arise. And why wouldn’t they arise given Iran’s track record of secrecy? Until outsiders let the world know about them, the facilities at Natanz and Fordow were built and operated in secret.
U.S. officials thought they had an agreement in principle that the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency could investigate undeclared sites. But that agreement was weak, as Iran could dispute the requests in an international forum before the inspections could proceed – allowing plenty of time for work to be covered up. Now, even that compromise is in jeopardy after Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei said he would never allow foreigners into Iran’s military bases.
Iran denies it wants to build a nuclear bomb, but the nations negotiating this agreement have their doubts and rightly must be able to verify that such activity is not happening.
Inspection of the undeclared sites is key as negotiators push for an agreement by the June 30 deadline. It’s delusional to think you have an enforceable agreement if you can’t inspect military bases and other sites where work toward a bomb could be done.
And without that there’s no point in lifting the sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table.
Published by Albuquerque Journal Editorial Board،June 17, 2015.