On April 15, the New York Post in an article by a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Peter Brookes, wrote new information continues to blast away at last November’s controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the supposed dormant state of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which the US intelligence community believes ended in 2003.

This week, Iran announced putting an additional 6,000 centrifuges on-line at its underground Natanz uranium enrichment plant and opening a new facility for processing uranium ore into yellowcake, the first step in the uranium enrichment process.
As is well known, Iran already has 3,000 centrifuges spinning at Natanz, which – if unchecked – could produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon if running “efficiently” 24/7 for a year.

Increasing suspicion, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad ordered the launch of a single-stage ballistic missile described as a “space launch vehicle,” or SLV, from a new space center in northern Iran.
While Iran’s space launch program could be relatively benign, such as for putting communications or scientific satellites into orbit, it could also be setting the stage for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile program.
Theoretically, if you can launch a ballistic missile that can place a satellite into earth orbit, you have the scientific wherewithal to hit a target anywhere on Earth with a warhead, including a nuclear weapon.
Unfortunately, all signals point to Iran having the seemingly undeniable strategic intent of developing a nuclear weapons capability.
So why does it appear we may have gotten it wrong?

Several reasons come to mind. First, the public only saw the NIE’s unclassified key judgments, which may not have accurately reflected the classified version of the 140-plus page report.
Second, Iran is a “tough target” for intelligence collection. Third, an NIE is more like a photograph than a movie; it’s based on what you know at a specific moment in time. Fourth, written by human beings, NIEs are vulnerable to individual biases.
But regardless, the fate of this country’s security is tied to estimates like these. Intelligence is our first line of defense in a dangerous world. We must get it right for the benefit of both the public as well as the policymakers.